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In this paper we analyze two house allocation mechanisms each of which is designed to
eliminate ineﬃciencies in real-life house allocation problems where there are both existing
tenants and newcomers. The ￿rst mechanism chooses the unique core allocation of a ￿sis-
ter￿ exchange economy which is constructed by assigning each existing tenant her current
house and randomly assigning each newcomer a vacant house. The second mechanism
-top trading cycles mechanism- ￿rst chooses an ordering from a given distribution and
next determines the ￿nal outcome as follows: Assign ￿rst agent her top choice, next agent
her top choice among remaining houses and so on, until someone demands house of an
existing tenant who is still in the line. At that point modify the queue by inserting her at
the top and proceed. Similarly, insert any existing tenant who is not already served at the
top of the queue once her house is demanded. Whenever a loop of existing tenants forms,
assign each of them the house she demands and proceed. Our main result is that the core
based mechanism is equivalent to an extreme case of the top trading cycles mechanism
which orders newcomers before the existing tenants.
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11 Introduction
Motivated by real-life on-campus housing practices Abdulkadiroø glu and S￿nmez (1999) intro-
duce house allocation problems with existing tenants: A set of houses should be allocated to
a set of agents by a centralized clearing house. Some of the agents are existing tenants each
of whom already occupies a house and the rest of the agents are newcomers. In addition to
occupied houses, there are vacant houses. Existing tenants are not only entitled to keep their
current houses but also apply for other houses.
The mechanism known as random serial-dictatorship with squatting rights is used in most
real-life applications of these problems.1 This mechanism works as follows:
(a) Each existing tenant decides whether she will enter the housing lottery or keep her current
house. Those who prefer keeping their houses are assigned their houses. All other houses
become available for allocation.
( b )A no r d e r i n go fa g e n t si nt h el o t t e r yi sr a n d o m l yc h o s e nf r o mag i v e nd i s t r i b u t i o no f
orderings. This distribution may be uniform or it may favor some groups.
(c) Once the agents are ordered, available houses are allocated using the induced serial dic-
tatorship:T h e￿rst agent receives her top choice, the next agent receives her top choice
among the remaining houses and so on.
While this mechanism is very popular in real-life applications, it suﬀers from a major de-
￿ciency. Since it does not guarantee each existing tenant a house that is as good as her own,
some existing tenants may choose to keep their houses even though they wish to move, and
this may result in loss of potentially large gains from trade. Hence this popular mechanism is
neither individually rational nor Pareto eﬃcient.2 One can ￿xt h i sd e ￿ciency via two alternative
approaches:
1. The ￿rst approach is based on the key mechanism for an important special case of our
model. Consider the case where there are only existing tenants and occupied houses. This
special case is known as housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974). For each housing
market there is a unique core allocation which also coincides with the unique competitive
allocation (Roth and Postlewaite, 1977). Core, as a mechanism, is strategy-proof (Roth,
1982) and it is the only mechanism that is Pareto eﬃcient, individually rational and
strategy-proof (Ma, 1994). Based on these results, core (or equivalently the competitive
mechanism) is considered the key mechanism for housing markets and hence it is natural
to consider the following mechanism for house allocation problems with existing tenants:
(a) First construct an initial allocation by (i) assigning each existing tenant her own
house and (ii) randomly assigning the vacant houses to newcomers with uniform
distribution, and
(b) next choose the core of the induced housing market to determine the ￿nal outcome.
1Some examples include undergraduate housing at Carnegie-Mellon, Duke, Michigan, Northwestern and
Pennsylvania.
2See Chen and S￿nmez (2002, 2004) for experimental evidence of this ineﬃciency.
2This mechanism is individually rational, Pareto eﬃcient and strategy-proof.
2. The second approach is a direct one. First choose an ordering of agents from a given
distribution of orderings and next determine the ￿nal outcome using the following ￿you
request my house-I get your turn (YRMH-IGYT)￿ algorithm: Assign ￿rst agent her top
choice, second agent her top choice among the remaining houses and so on, until someone
demands house of an existing tenant. If at that point the existing tenant is already
served then do not disturb the procedure. Otherwise modify the remainder of the queue
by inserting her at the top and proceed. Similarly, insert any existing tenant who is not
already served at the top of the queue once her house is demanded. If at any point a loop
forms, it is formed by existing tenants and in such cases remove all agents in the loop by
assigning them the houses they demand and proceed.
The key innovation in this mechanism is that an existing tenant whose current house is
r e q u e s t e di su p g r a d e dt ot h et o po ft h eq u e u eb e f o r eh e rh o u s ei sa s s i g n e d .A sar e s u l t
it is individually rational as it assures every existing tenant a house that is at least as
good as her own. In addition it is also Pareto eﬃcient and strategy-proof. YRMH-IGYT
algorithm reduces Gale￿s top trading cycles algorithm for the special case of housing
markets and following Abdulkadiroø glu and S￿nmez (1999) we refer above mechanism as
the top trading cycles mechanism.
In this paper we show that there is an important relation between the two mechanisms
described above: The core based mechanism is equivalent to an extreme case of the top-trading
cycles mechanism where newcomers are randomly ordered ￿rst and existing tenants are ran-
domly ordered next. This result illustrates that there is a hidden bias in the core based mech-
anism. Recall that in that mechanism an initial allocation is constructed by assigning each
existing tenant her current house and randomly assigning vacant houses to newcomers. This
might be interpreted as granting property rights of vacant houses to newcomers. Therefore
existing tenants who also have claims on vacant houses give up these claims under the core
based mechanism. In that sense the bias in the core based mechanism is quite intuitive.
Our main result has an important corollary for the special case of house allocation prob-
lems (without existing tenants): The popular real-life mechanism random serial dictatorship is
equivalent to core from random endowments. (Here random serial dictatorship randomly or-
ders the agents and assigns the ￿rst agent her top choice, the next agent her top choice among
remaining houses and so on whereas core from random endowments randomly chooses an ini-
tial allocation and chooses the core of the induced housing market.) This equivalence result is
originally shown by Abdulkadiroø glu and S￿nmez (1998) and it provides important support for
both mechanisms since the two key mechanisms for house allocation problems are equivalent.
The policy implication of our paper is quite diﬀerent than that of Abdulkadiroø glu and S￿nmez
(1998). While core from random endowments is a key mechanism for house allocation problems,
its extension to house allocation problems with existing tenants is extremely biased in favor of
newcomers. In most real-life applications the priority is intended for existing tenants and our
result shows that the core based approach is not the best choice in such cases.3 Encouraged
3One could argue that the setup itself favors existing tenants since they each have a current house that they
could keep assuring a lower bound on their welfare and therefore it is only fair that the chosen mechanism favors
the newcomers for the vacant houses. In our view this normative issue shall be resolved by the central planner.
3by Abdulkadiroø glu and S￿nmez (1998), one may be tempted to use the core based mechanism
for house allocation problems with existing tenants. Our paper shows that this approach may
produce an undesired bias which can be avoided via the top trading cycles mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we formally introduce the model
as well as the special case of housing markets and Gale￿s top trading cycles algorithm. In
Section 3 we introduce the two mechanisms studied in the paper and analyze the dynamics of
the YRMH-IGYT algorithm. In Section 4 we present our equivalence result and its corollary
in the context of house allocation problems. Finally in Section 5 we conclude.
2 House Allocation with Existing Tenants
A set of houses (or other indivisible goods) should be allocated to a set of agents by a centralized
clearing-house. Some of these agents are existing tenants each of whom already occupies a
house, the rest of the agents are newcomers and there are houses which are vacant. Existing
tenants are not only entitled to keep their current houses but also to apply for other houses if
they wish. The main real-life application we have in mind is on-campus house allocation.
Formally, a house allocation problem with existing tenants (Abdulkadiroø glu and
S￿nmez, 1999) is a ￿ve-tuple hAE,A N,H O,H V,Pi where AE = {a1,a 2,...,a n} is a ￿nite set
of existing tenants, AN = {an+1,...,a n+m} is a ￿nite set of newcomers, HO = {ha}a∈AE is a
￿nite set of occupied houses, HV is a ￿nite set of vacant houses, and P =( Pa)a∈AE∪AN is a list
of strict preference relations. Let A = AE ∪AN denote the set of all agents and H = HO ∪HV
denote the set of all houses. We assume that |H| = |A| = n + m and thus |HV| = |AN| = m.
Each agent a ∈ A has a strict preference relation Pa on the set of houses H.L e tRa denote the
￿at-least-as-good-as￿ relation associated with Pa. Preferences are ￿xed throughout the paper.
A matching ￿ is an assignment of houses to agents such that each agent is assigned one
house and each house is assigned to a diﬀerent agent. Formally speaking a matching is a one-
to-one mapping ￿ : A → H. For all a ∈ A, we refer ￿(a) as the assignment of agent a under ￿.
Let M be the set of all matchings. Note that |M| =( n + m)!.
A lottery is a probability distribution over all matchings. Let 4M denote the set of all
lotteries. In order to simplify the exposition we abuse the notation and let ￿ also denote the
lottery that assigns probability 1 to matching ￿.
2.1 Housing Markets
The class of housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) is an important subclass of our
model where there are only existing tenants and occupied houses.4 Formally a housing market
is a four-tuple hA,H,P,￿i where A is a ￿nite set of agents, H is a ￿nite set of houses, P is
a list of strict preference relations, and ￿ is a matching which speci￿es the initial allocation.
Throughout the paper we ￿x A, H and P so that each matching ￿ de￿nes a housing market.
Given a housing market ￿, the coalition T ⊆ A blocks am a t c h i n gη ∈ M if there exists a
matching ν ∈ M such that (i) ν(a) ∈ {h ∈ H : h = ￿(a0) for some a0 ∈ T} for all a ∈ T,( i i )
ν(a)Raη(a) for all a ∈ T, and (iii) ν(a)Paη(a) for some a ∈ T.Am a t c h i n gη is in the core of
a housing market ￿ if it is not blocked by any coalition.
4See Moulin (1995) for an extensive analysis of housing markets.
4The core plays the key role for housing markets. Roth and Postlewaite (1977) show that
there is a unique matching in the core of each housing market which also coincides with the
unique competitive allocation. The core as a mechanism is strategy-proof (Roth, 1982) and
it is the only mechanism that is Pareto eﬃcient, individually rational and strategy-proof (Ma,
1994).
2.2 Gale￿s Top Trading Cycles Algorithm
Gale￿s top trading cycles algorithm (GTTCA) is an iterative algorithm which is used to
￿nd the unique core allocation of a housing market. This algorithm is one of the two key
algorithms in this paper and it is de￿ned as follows:
Round 1: Each agent points to the agent who owns her most preferred house. Since the
number of agents is ￿nite, there is at least one cycle (a cycle is either a singleton (a1) who
points to herself or an ordered list (a1,...,a k) of agents where a1 points to ak, ak points to
ak−1,...,a 2 points to a1). In each cycle corresponding trades are performed and all agents in
a cycle are removed together with their assignments. (Note that all of them are assigned their
most preferred houses.) If there are remaining agents then we proceed with the next round.
In general,
Round t: Each remaining agent points to the agent who owns her most preferred house
among those remaining in the market. In each cycle corresponding trades are performed and
all agents in a cycle are removed together with their assignments. If there are remaining agents
then we proceed with the next round.
By the ￿niteness of agents, at least one cycle forms at each round so that the algorithm
terminates in at most |A| rounds.
3 Matching and Lottery Mechanisms
A matching mechanism is a systematic procedure to select a matching for each house alloca-
tion problem with existing tenants. Similarly a lottery mechanism is a systematic procedure
to select a lottery for each problem.
3.1 Core Based Mechanisms
Let M∗ = {￿ ∈ M : ￿(a)=ha for all a ∈ AE} be the set of matchings which assign each
existing tenant her current house. Note that |M∗| = m!.F o rg i v e nA, H and for each ￿ ∈ M∗
de￿ne mechanism ϕ￿ as follows: For any preference pro￿le mechanism ϕ￿ interprets ￿ as the
initial allocation and chooses the core of the induced housing market. Since the preferences are
￿xed throughout the paper, we denote the outcome of mechanism ϕ￿ also with ϕ￿ dropping
the argument in ϕ￿(P).
Since core is the key mechanism for housing markets, it is natural to consider the following
lottery mechanism for house allocation problems with existing tenants:
1. For each problem, ￿rst construct an initial endowment by (i) assigning each existing
tenant her current house and (ii) randomly assigning vacant house to newcomers with
uniform distribution, and
52. next choose the core of the induced housing market as the ￿nal outcome.








3.2 Mechanisms Through a Direct Approach
Let f : {1,...,n+m} → A be a bijection and F be the class of all such bijections. We refer each
such bijection as an ordering of agents and denote it as the ordered list (f(1),f(2),...,f(n+
m)). For any ordering f ∈ F,i t si n v e r s ef−1(.) is de￿ned as f−1(a)=i if and only if f(i)=a.
For each A∗ ⊂ A,ab i j e c t i o nf : {1,...,|A∗|} → A∗ is referred as a sub-order.H e r e a g e n t
f(1) is the head and agent f(|A∗|) is the tail of the sub-order f.
For a given ordering f ∈ F consider the following ￿you request my house - I get your
turn (YRMH-IGYT)￿ algorithm (Abdulkadiroø glu and S￿nmez, 1999): For any given ordering
f, assign the ￿rst agent her top choice, the second agent her top choice among the remaining
houses, and so on, until an agent a demands house ha0 of an existing tenant a0.I fa tt h a tp o i n t
existing tenant a0 is already served then do not disturb the procedure. Otherwise, modify the
queue by inserting existing tenant a0 to the top so that existing tenant a0 is at the top of the
line, agent a is second in the line and the rest of the line is uninterrupted. Next it is the turn
of existing tenant a0 and there are three possibilities:
1. Existing tenant a0 demands her own house ha0: In this case existing tenant a0 is assigned
her own house ha0; next, once again, it is the turn of agent a and she demands her top
choice among the remaining houses and the procedure continues in a similar way.
2. Existing tenant a0 demands an available house h that is either vacant or that used to
be the house of an existing tenant who is already assigned another house: In this case
existing tenant a0 is assigned the available house h,a g e n ta is assigned house ha0,a n dt h e
procedure continues with the next agent in line.
3. Existing tenant a0 demands house ha00 of another existing tenant a00 who is still in the line:
In this case modify the queue by inserting existing tenant a00 at the top so that existing
tenant a00 is at the top of the line, existing tenant a0 is second in the line, agent a is third
i nt h el i n ea n dt h er e s to ft h el i n ei su n i n t e r r u p t e d .N e x ti ti st h et u r no fe x i s t i n gt e n a n t
a00 and the procedure continues in a similar way.
As we proceed, existing tenants may form loop-orders. (A loop-order is either a singleton
(a1) who demands her own house or an ordered list (a1,...,a k) of existing tenants where agent
a1 demands the house of agent ak,a g e n tak demands the house of agent ak−1,. . . ,a g e n ta2
demands the house of agent a1.) In such cases, remove all agents in the loop-order by assigning
them the houses they demand and proceed.
For any ordering f ∈ F,l e tψf denote the induced matching mechanism through YRMH-
IGYT algorithm. Following Abdulkadiroø glu and S￿nmez (1999), we refer this mechanism as
the top trading cycles mechanism. Since the preferences are ￿xed, we denote the outcome
of YRMH-IGYT algorithm also with ψf dropping the argument in ψf(P). In this paper we are
6particularly interested in orderings which place existing tenants at the end of the line giving
priority to newcomers. De￿ne e F = {f ∈ F : f−1(a) <f −1(a0) for all a ∈ AN and a0 ∈ AE}.








That is, an ordering f among those which give priority to newcomers is randomly chosen with
uniform distribution and next the outcome is obtained using YRMH-IGYT algorithm.
3.3 Dynamics of YRMH-IGYT Algorithm
Since YRMH-IGYT algorithm is key to this paper, it is crucial to understand how it works. For
a given ordering f,t h eserial-dictatorship induced by f allocates the houses as follows: The
￿rst agent receives her top choice, the next agent receives her top choice among the remaining
houses and so on. For a given ordering f ∈ F, construct the eﬀective-order ef ∈ F as
follows: Run YRMH-IGYT algorithm and order agents in the same order their assignments are
￿nalized. When there is a loop-order, order these agents as in the loop-order.
We illustrate the construction of ef with the following example. Later on we use the same
example to illustrate other constructions that are crucial to this paper. Example 1 is rather
involved in order to capture every key aspect of these constructions.
Example 1: Let AE = {a1,a 2,a 3,a 4,a 5,a 6,a 7,a 8,a 9} be the set of existing tenants, AN =
{a10,a 11,a 12,a 13,a 14,a 15,a 16} be the set of newcomers, H0 = {h1,h 2,h 3,h 4,h 5,h 6,h 7,h 8,h 9}
be the set of occupied houses, and HV = {h10,h 11,h 12,h 13,h 14,h 15,h 16} be the set of vacant
houses. (Here hi i st h ec u r r e n th o u s eo fe x i s t i n gt e n a n tai for i ≤ 9.) Let the preference pro￿le
P be given as:5
AE AN z }| {
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9
h15 h3 h1 h2 h9 h6 h6 h6 h11
. . . h4 h3
. . .
. . .







a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16
h7 h2 h4 h6 h8 h1 h5










Let f =( a13,a 15,a 11,a 14,a 12,a 16,a 10,a 1,a 2,a 3,a 4,a 5,a 6,a 7,a 8,a 9) be the ordering of the
agents. The following series of ￿gures illustrates the dynamics of the YRMH-IGYT algorithm.
When an agent￿s assignment under ψf is ￿nalized, that is indicated with bold arrows and
reported at the right end of the ￿gure. The eﬀective-order ef orders the agents in the same
order as their assignments are ￿nalized.
                                               h1  h2  h3  h4  h5  h6  h7  h8  h9  h10  h11  h12  h13  h14  h15  h16 
 
 
a13  a15  a11  a14  a12  a16  a10  a1  a2  a3  a4  a5  a6  a7  a8  a9 
 
 
5After the best few houses the rest of the preferences are arbitrary for each agent.
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h6                                                h1  h2  h3  h4  h5  h7  h8  h9  h10  h11  h12  h13  h14  h15  h16 
 
          ψ
f(a6) = h6 




                                               h1  h2  h3  h4  h5  h7  h8  h9  h10  h11  h12  h13  h14  h15  h16 
   
          ψ
f(a13) = h13  
 a13  a15  a11  a14  a12  a16  a10  a1  a2  a3  a4  a5  a7  a8  a9 
 
 
                                         h1  h2  h3  h4  h5  h7  h8  h9  h10  h11  h12  h14  h15  h16 
 
 





h1                                           h2  h3  h4  h5  h7  h8  h9  h10  h11  h12  h14  h15  h16 
          ψ
f(a1) = h15 
          ψ
f(a15) = h1  
a1   a15  a11  a14  a12  a16  a10  a2  a3  a4  a5  a7  a8  a9 
 
                                   h2  h3  h4  h5  h7  h8  h9  h10  h11  h12  h14  h16 
 
 




 h2                                     h3  h4  h5  h7  h8  h9  h10  h11  h12  h14  h16 
 
 




h3   h2                                     h4  h5  h7  h8  h9  h10  h11  h12  h14  h16 
 
          ψ
f(a3) = h3 
a3   a2    a11  a14  a12   a16  a10  a4  a5  a7  a8  a9 
 
 
 h2                                     h4  h5  h7  h8  h9  h10  h11  h12  h14  h16 
 
 




h4   h2                                     h5  h7  h8  h9  h10  h11  h12  h14  h16 
          ψ
f(a4) = h2 
          ψ
f(a2) = h4 




                                   h5   h7  h8   h9  h10  h11  h12  h14  h16 
 
          ψ
f(a11) = h16 
 a11   a14  a12   a16  a10  a5  a7  a8   a9 
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                            h5   h7   h8   h9  h10  h11  h12  h14 
 
 





h8                               h5   h7   h9  h10  h11  h12  h14 
          ψ
f(a8) = h12 
          ψ
f(a14) = h8 




                      h5   h7   h9  h10  h11  h14  
 
          ψ
f(a12) = h14 
a12   a16   a10  a5   a7   a9 
 
 
                 h5   h7   h9    h10    h11 
 
 
a16    a10   a5   a7    a9    
 
 
h5                   h7   h9  h10  h11 
 
 





h9    h5                  h7   h10  h11  
          ψ
f(a9) = h11 
          ψ
f(a5) = h9 
a9      a5    a16   a10  a7               ψ
f(a16) = h5   
 
       h7   h10   
 
 




h7    h10 
          ψ
f(a7) = h7 
 
a7    a10 
 
 
h10   
 
          ψ
f(a10) = h10 
a10     
 
In this example agents￿ assignments are ￿nalized in the following order:
ef =( a6,a 13,a 1,a 15,a 3,a 4,a 2,a 11,a 8,a 14,a 12,a 9,a 5,a 16,a 7,a 10)




a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16
h15 h4 h3 h2 h9 h6 h7 h12 h11 h10 h16 h14 h13 h8 h1 h5
¶
Recall that only existing tenants are inserted to the top of the line in the YRMH-IGYT
algorithm. Therefore the relative order of newcomers in an ordering f and its eﬀective-order
ef are the same.





Next consider an ordering f ∈ e F. Here agents f(1),...,f(m) are newcomers. Since the
relative order of newcomers are identical in f and ef,t h ee ﬀective-order ef will order agents as
follows: Some existing tenants (possibly none) are followed by f(1), followed by some existing
tenants (possibly none), followed by f(2), ..., followed by f(m), followed by some existing
tenants (possibly none).
Consider newcomer f(1) w h oi sa tt h et o po fo r d e r i n gf.I fs h ei sn o ta tt h et o po fe ﬀective-
order ef that means she requested the current house of an existing tenant who might have
requested the current house of another existing tenant and so on. Insertion of existing tenants
will stop once any of these existing tenants (or the newcomer f(1) herself) requests a vacant
house. Therefore one and only one agent among newcomer f(1) and her predecessors in ef will
be assigned a vacant house. Similarly for any k ≤ m, k agents will be assigned vacant houses
among newcomer f(k) and her predecessors in ef. Hence we have the following observation:
Observation 2: Let f ∈ e F and consider the matching ψf. There is one and only one agent
between ef(1) and f(1) in eﬀective-order ef who is assigned a vacant house. Similarly for each
k ≤ m, there is one and only one agent between the immediate successor of f(k − 1) and f(k)
in ef who is assigned a vacant house.
For each f ∈ e F, YRMH-IGYT algorithm assigns houses in one of two possible ways:
1. There is a sub-order (a1,...,a k) of agents where
(a) ak is a newcomer, a1,...,a k−1 are existing tenants and
(b) a1 receives a vacant house, a2 receives a1￿s house, ..., ak receives ak−1￿s house.
We call each such sub-order a serial-order (S).
2. There is a sub-order (a1,...,a k) of existing tenants where a1 receives ak￿s house, ak
receives ak−1￿s house, ..., a2 receives a1￿s house. Recall that we call each such sub-order
a loop-order (L).
Therefore eﬀective-order ef is a sequence L,...,L,S 1,L,...,L,S 2,...,L,S m,L,...,L of
serial-orders and loop-orders where the tail of serial-order Si is newcomer f(i) for i ≤ m.
Example 1 continued: Following the dynamics of YRMH-IGYT algorithm in Example 1,


































103.4 A Simpli￿cation of Mechanism Ψ
De￿ne F∗ = {f ∈ e F : a<a 0 ⇒ f−1(a) <f −1(a0) for all a,a0 ∈ AE}. That is, orderings in F∗
not only order newcomers before existing tenants but also order existing tenants based on their
index. Note that |F∗| = m!. The following lemma states that the outcome of YRMH-IGYT
algorithm is identical for two orderings in e F as long as newcomers are ordered in the same way
under both orderings.
Lemma 1: Let f,g ∈ e F be such that f(i)=g(i) for all i ≤ m.T h e nψf = ψg.
Proof :L e tf,g ∈ e F be such that f(i)=g(i) for all i ≤ m.S i n c e f(i)=g(i) for all i ≤ m,
YRMH-IGYT algorithm works identical for both orderings until newcomer f(m) (i.e. the last
newcomer) is assigned a house. Therefore for each i ≤ m,a g e n tf(i) is assigned the same
house under ψf and ψg. Next consider the rest of the agents each of whom is an existing
tenant. YRMH-IGYT algorithm is equivalent to GTTCA when there are only existing tenants
(Abdulkadiroø glu and S￿nmez, 1999) and therefore each of the remaining agents receive the
unique core assignment of the remaining market under either ordering. Hence ψf = ψg. ♦








That is, ￿rst randomly order the newcomers with uniform distribution, next order the existing
tenants based on their index and ￿nally obtain the outcome using YRMH-IGYT algorithm.
4M a i n R e s u l t
Our main contribution is that the two lottery mechanisms Φ and Ψ are equivalent. Recall
that both mechanisms select a uniform lottery over m! matchings for each problem. Here is
our proof strategy: For each ordering f ∈ F∗ we construct a matching η(f) ∈ M∗ such that
ψf = ϕη(f). Next we show that mapping η : F∗ → M∗ is a bijection by constructing its inverse
mapping. Therefore mapping η is such that f 6= g ⇔ η(f) 6= η(g) for all f,g ∈ F∗ and this in
turn implies that Φ = Ψ.
4.1 Construction of Mapping η
Construction of mapping η : F∗ → M∗ is quite involved and it requires additional notation.
T h ek e yc h a l l a n g ei nt h i sc o n s t r u c t i o ni s￿nding a mapping which is a bijection (i.e. one-to-one
and onto). Otherwise it would be a straightforward task to construct a mapping ν : F∗ → M∗
such that ψf = ϕν(f) for each f ∈ F∗. For example one such mapping ν can be constructed by
simply
1. ￿nding the eﬀective order, loop-orders, serial-orders, and
2. assigning each agent at the tail of a serial-order (who is by de￿nition a newcomer) the
vacant house allocated in the serial-order.
11When we run GTTCA with this initial allocation, each of the loop-orders and the serial-
orders obtained in the YRMH-IGYT algorithm will form as a cycle, and hence the same outcome
will be obtained by the two algorithms. However the mapping ν is not one-to-one and thus
two distinct orderings f,g may yield the same initial allocation ν(f)=ν(g). We illustrate this
point with our running example.
Example 1 continued: Recall that for ordering
f =( a13,a 15,a 11,a 14,a 12,a 16,a 10,a 1,a 2,a 3,a 4,a 5,a 6,a 7,a 8,a 9),


































Next consider the ordering
g =( a15,a 13,a 11,a 14,a 12,a 16,a 10,a 1,a 2,a 3,a 4,a 5,a 6,a 7,a 8,a 9)
which diﬀers from ordering f in only the order of agents a13 and a15.I nt h i sc a s et h ee ﬀective


































which consists of the same loop-orders and same serial-orders as eﬀective order ef, although in
ad i ﬀerent sequence. Since the serial-orders are the same for the two eﬀective orders, the above
mentioned mapping ν yields
ν(f)=ν(g)=
￿
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16
h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h16 h14 h13 h12 h15 h11
¶
.
We next proceed with additional notation need for the construction of mappning η.R e -
call that for each f ∈ F∗ eﬀective-order ef is a sequence of serial-orders and loop-orders
L,...,L,S1,L,...,L,S 2,...,L,S m,L,...,L. Moreover newcomer f(1) is the tail of serial-order
S1,n e w c o m e rf(2) is the tail of serial-order S2, ..., newcomer f(m) is the tail of serial-order
Sm.W ep a r t i t i o ns e r i a l - o r d e r sa n dl o o p - o r d e r so fe ﬀective-order ef as follows:
Step 1: Starting with agent ef(1) c l e a re a c ha g e n ti no r d e ru n t i li ti st h et u r no fa na g e n t
a for whom her assignment ψf(a) is worse than a house previously assigned to an agent in a
serial-order. Terminate ￿rst step right after the last serial-order before agent a. Next proceed
to step 2. If such an agent does not exist then ef consists of a single step.
In general,
Step t: Starting with the next agent clear agents one at a time until it is the turn of an
agent a for whom her assignment ψf(a) is worse than a house previously assigned to an agent
in a serial-order of current step t. Terminate step t after the last serial-order before agent a.
Next proceed to step t +1 . If such an agent does not exist then ef consists of t steps.
Let ef consist of T steps. For each t ≤ T,l e tSt denote the set of serial-orders of ef at step
t, Lt denote the set of loop-orders of ef at step t and At
N denote the set of newcomers at step
12t.F o re a c ht ≤ T,l e tASt denote the set of agents in serial-orders of St and ALt denote the set
of agents in loop-orders of Lt.F o re a c ht ≤ T,l e tψf(St) denote the set of houses assigned to
agents in ASt and ψf(Lt) denote the set of houses assigned to agents in ALt. For any loop-order
L let ψf(L) denote the set of houses assigned to members of L and for any serial-order S let
ψf(S) denote the set of houses assigned to members of S.
Now we iteratively construct sets G1,...,G T of houses as follows: First consider houses
which are assigned to agents in serial-orders. For any t ≤ T, include in Gt all houses in ψf(St).
We may include additional houses to G1,...,G T−1 as explained below.
Next consider houses which are assigned to agents in loop-orders. We skip loop-orders in
L1. Start with the ￿rst loop-order L in L2.I fa n ya g e n ta ∈ L prefers any of the current houses
in G1 to her own assignment ψf(a) then enlarge G1 by including houses in ψf(L).I fn os u c h
agent exists, do not change G1 at this point. Similarly consider each loop-order one at a time
in order. For any loop-order ￿r s td e t e r m i n ew h i c hs t e po fef it belongs. Suppose it is the turn
of loop-order L ∈ Lt.I fa n ya g e n ta in loop-order L prefers any of the current houses in Gt−1
to her own assignment ψf(a) then enlarge Gt−1 by including houses in ψf(L).I fn os u c ha g e n t
exists then check whether any agent a in loop-order L prefers any of the current houses in Gt−2
to her own assignment ψf(a).I fs ot h e ne n l a r g eGt−2 by including houses in ψf(L).I fn os u c h
agent exists then check whether .... If no such agent exists then check whether any agent a in
loop-order L prefers any of the current houses in G1 to her own assignment ψf(a).I fs ot h e n
enlarge G1 by including houses in ψf(L). If no such agent exists then do not change any of
Gt−1,...,G 1 at this point and proceed with the next loop-order.6
Remark 1:C o n s i d e ra n yt ∈ {1,...,T}. Pick any loop-order L in ef. We have ψf(L) ⊆ Gt if
a n do n l yi f( i )t h e r ee x i s t sa na g e n ta in loop-order L and a house h ∈ Gt such that hPaψf(a),
and (ii) for any agent a0 in loop-order L, for any r ∈ {t +1 ,...,T},a n df o ra n yh0 ∈ Gr we
have ψf(a0)Pa0h0.
For t>1,l e tS∗t ⊆ St be the set of serial-orders at step t where at least one member of the
serial-order prefers a house in Gt−1 to her assignment under ψf.T h a ti s
S
∗t = {S ∈ S
t : hPaψ
f(a) for some house h ∈ G
t−1 and some agent a in serial-order S}
For each t>1, S∗t is non-empty by construction of step t of ef together with construction of
Gt−1. Finally for t>1,l e tA∗t
N be the set of newcomers each of whom is the tail of a serial-order
in S∗t.7
We are ready to construct mapping η : F∗ → M∗.F o re a c hf ∈ F∗:
6Construction of sets G1,...,G T m a k e si tp o s s i b l et o￿ l i n k ￿t h en e w c o m e r si nt h es a m es t e ps ot h a tt h e i r
assignments are ￿nalized simultaneously under the GTTCA. Moreover the construction assures that newcomers
in Step t leave GTTCA before newcomers in Step s for t<s . Therefore it will be possible to recover the relative
ordering of two newcomers in the original ordering used by the YRMH-IGYT algorithm, provided that the two
newcomers belong to serial-orders of diﬀerent steps.
7As we have already indicated the construction of steps of ef and sets G1,...,G T make it possible to recover
t h er e l a t i v eo r d e r i n go ft w on e w c o m e r si nd i ﬀerent steps. Depending on which serial-orders join to form cycles
in the GTTCA, recovering the relative ordering of some of the newcomers in the same cycle (who are necessarily
in the same step) will also be possible. However this will not uniquely determine
1. the relative ordering of newcomers in Step 1, or
2. the relative ranking of newcomers in A∗t
N for t>1.
In the construction of matching η(f), the indices of these newcomers will be utilized for this purpose.
131. Find eﬀective-order ef. Find loop-orders, serial-orders and steps of ef as well as sets {Gt},
{S∗t} and {A∗t
N}.
2. For each existing tenant a ∈ AE,l e tη(f)(a)=ha. That is, each existing tenant is
assigned her current house under η(f).
3. Next we handle newcomers in step 1 of ef. The number of vacant houses assigned at step
1 is equal to the number of newcomers at step 1. Let G1
V be the set of vacant houses
assigned at step 1 of ef. Assign the ￿rst newcomer in ef the smallest indexed house in
G1
V, the second newcomer in ef the second smallest indexed house in G1
V, ...,t h el a s t
newcomer in step 1 of ef the biggest indexed house in G1
V under matching η(f).
4. Finally we handle newcomers in step t of ef for t>1.
Recall that (i) each newcomer at step t is the tail of a serial-order and (ii) in each serial-
order only the head agent is assigned a vacant house. Newcomers in A∗t
N will be treated
diﬀerently than newcomers in At
N \ A∗t
N.
(a) Newcomers in A∗t
N: Recall that A∗t
N is the set of newcomers each of whom is the tail
of a serial-order in S∗t. For each serial-order S ∈ S∗t, ￿n dt h ev a c a n th o u s et h a ti s
assigned in the next serial-order of ef unless S is the last serial-order of step t.I f
S ∈ S∗t is the last serial-order of step t then ￿nd the vacant house that is assigned
in the ￿rst serial-order of step t.L e t G∗t
V be the resulting set of vacant houses.
Order newcomers in A∗t
N based on their order in ef. Under matching η(f) the ￿rst
newcomer in A∗t
N receives the smallest indexed house in G∗t
V , the second newcomer in
A∗t
N receives the second smallest indexed house in G∗t
V and so on.
(b) Newcomers in At
N\A∗t
N:U n d e rη(f) each such newcomer who is not the last newcomer
of step t receives the vacant house that is assigned in the next serial-order. If the
newcomer is the last newcomer of step t then she receives the vacant house that is
assigned in the ￿rst serial-order of step t.
As we already emphasized, the set of newcomers A∗t
N plays a key role in construction of
matching η(f).U n d e rη(f) each agent in a serial-order S ∈ St is assigned a house h ∈ ψf(St).
Moreover when GTTCA is executed for housing market η(f), (i) serial-orders in St will form
one or more cycles among themselves and (ii) each of these cycles will contain at least one
newcomer in A∗t
N. Here the second point ensures that each serial-order in St becomes part of
a cycle and leaves the market after at least one of the serial orders in St−1. In Section 4.2
we execute GTTCA in such a way that cycles that include newcomers are removed from the
market simultaneously. That assures that agents in ASt−1 leave the market before agents in
ASt for any t>1. This point is key for construction of inverse mapping g in Section 4.2.
Remark 2: Pick any t>1. Execute GTTCA for housing market η(f) as explained in Section
4.2. No agent in ASt leaves the market before each agent in ASt−1 does.
Next we illustrate partition of ef into its steps, construction of sets G1,...,G T, S∗1,...,S∗T,
A∗1
N,...,A ∗T
N and construction of mapping η with our running example.
Example 1 continued: In order to construct η(f) we ￿rst partition ef into its steps. Clear
e a c ha g e n to n ea tat i m ef o l l o w i n gt h eo r d e ri nef.W ec a ns k i pt h ea g e n t su n t i lt h ee n do ft h e
14￿rst serial-order S1. Consider agent a1.W eh a v eψf(a1)=h15 which is the top choice of agent
a1.S os k i pt oa g e n ta15.W eh a v eψf(a15)=h1 w h i c hi st h et o pc h o i c eo fa g e n ta15.S os k i pt o









and moreover agent a15 is a member of serial-order S2. Therefore Step 1 ends right after the
last serial-order before agent a3, namely serial-order S2 =( a1,a 15).
We can skip the agents until the end of the ￿rst serial-order of Step 2. Consider agent a8.
We have ψf(a8)=h12 and for agent a8 only house h6 is better. However house h6 is assigned to
agent a6 w h oi sam e m b e ro fal o o p - o r d e r .S os k i pt oa g e n ta14.W eh a v eψf(a14)=h8 which is
the top choice of agent a14.S os k i pt oa g e n ta12.W eh a v eψf(a12)=h14 and for agent a12 only
house h4 is better. However house h4 is assigned to agent a4 w h oi sam e m b e ro fal o o p - o r d e r .
So skip to agent a9.W eh a v eψf(a9)=h11 w h i c hi st h et o pc h o i c eo fa g e n ta9.S os k i pt oa g e n t
a5.W eh a v eψf(a5)=h9 which is the top choice of agent a5.S os k i pt oa g e n ta16.W eh a v e
ψf(a16)=h5 w h i c hi st h et o pc h o i c eo fa g e n ta16.S os k i pt oa g e n ta7.W eh a v eψf(a7)=h7
and for agent a7 only house h6 is better. However house h6 is assigned to agent a6 who is a









and moreover agent a8 is a member of serial-order S4 w h i c hi si nS t e p2 .T h e r e f o r eS t e p2e n d s
right after the last serial-order before agent a10, namely the serial-order S6 =( a9,a 5,a 16).








































N = {a13,a 15}, A2
N = {a11,a 14,a 12,a 16} and A3
N = {a10}.
Next, we construct sets of houses G1, G2 and G3:
First consider houses that are assigned to members of serial-orders. Serial-orders of Step 1
are S1, S2 and houses assigned in these serial-orders are h13, h15, h1. Therefore {h13,h 15,h 1} ⊆
G1. Serial-orders of Step 2 are S3, S4, S5, S6 and houses assigned in these serial-orders are h16,
h12, h8, h14, h11, h9, h5. Therefore {h16,h 12,h 8,h 14,h 11,h 9,h 5} ⊆ G2. The only serial-order of
Step 3 is S7 and the only house that is assigned in that serial-order is h10.T h e r e f o r e{h10} ⊆ G3.
Next consider houses which are assigned to agents in loop-orders. Skip loop-order L1 which





and h1 ∈ G
1
Hence we include house h3 to G1 since it is the only house assigned in loop-order L2.T h u s





and h3 ∈ G
1
15Hence we include houses h4,h 2 to G1 since they are the houses assigned in loop-order L3.T h u s
{h4,h 2} ⊆ G1. Finally consider loop-order L4 =( a7) which is in step 3. There is no house










so h7 6∈ G1 either. L4 is the last loop-order so G1, G2 and G3 are ￿nalized as:
G
1 = {h13,h 15,h 1,h 3,h 2,h 4},G
2 = {h16,h 12,h 8,h 14,h 11,h 9,h 5},G
3 = {h10}
Next we construct sets S∗2 and S∗3 of serial-orders and sets A∗2
N, A∗3
N of newcomers.
We have S∗2 = {S3,S 5} since










￿ and no member of S4 or S6 prefer any house in G1 to their assignment under ψf.
We have S∗3 = {S7} since






N consists of the tails of serial-orders S3, S5 and A∗3
N consists of the tail of
serial-order S7. Hence A∗2
N = {a11,a 12} and A∗3
N = {a10}.
We are ready to construct matching η(f):
1. For each existing tenant aj ∈ AE we have η(f)(aj)=hj.T h a ti sη(f)(aj)=hj for j ≤ 9.
2. Next consider the newcomers:
(a) Newcomers in Step 1 of ef:
G1
V = {h13,h 15} is the set of vacant houses assigned at Step 1 and A1
N = {a13,a 15}.
Since a13 is ordered before a15 in ef, newcomer a13 is assigned the smaller indexed
house in G1
V and a15 is assigned the bigger indexed house in G1
V under η(f). Therefore
η(f)(a13)=h13 and η(f)(a15)=h15.
(b) Newcomers in Step 2 of ef:
i. Newcomers in A∗2
N = {a11,a 12} :
The two serial-orders in S∗2 are S3 and S5.W eh a v eG∗2
V = {h11,h 12} because
16￿ h12 is the vacant house that is assigned in S4 which is the next serial-order
after S3 and
￿ h11 is the vacant house that is assigned in S6 which is the next serial-order
after S5.
Since a11 is ordered before a12 in ef,n e w c o m e ra11 is assigned the smaller indexed
house in G∗2
V and a12 is assigned the bigger indexed house in G∗2
V under η(f).
Therefore η(f)(a11)=h11 and η(f)(a12)=h12.
ii. Newcomers in A2
N\A∗2
N = {a14,a 16}:
Since newcomer a14 is a member of serial-order S4, her assignment under η(f)
is the vacant house that is assigned in the next serial-order S5. Therefore
η(f)(a14)=h14.N e w c o m e ra16 is a member of serial-order S6 which is the last
serial-order of Step 2. Therefore her assignment under η(f) is the vacant house
that is assigned in the ￿rst serial-order S3 of Step 2. Hence η(f)(a16)=h16.
(c) Newcomers in Step 3 of ef:
i. Newcomers in A∗3
N = {a10}:
The only vacant house that is assigned in Step 3 is h10. Therefore G∗3
V = {h10}
and η(f)(a10)=h10.
There are no remaining agents and therefore
η(f)=
￿
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16
h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 h15 h16
¶
We next show that for any f ∈ F∗, the outcome of the YRMH-IGYT algorithm is the same
as the core of the housing market induced by initial allocation η(f).
Lemma 2: For any f ∈ F∗ we have ϕη(f) = ψf.
Proof :L e tf ∈ F∗.B yd e ￿nition ϕη(f) is the core allocation of housing market η(f).
We ￿rst show that ϕη(f)(a)=ψf(a) for each agent a in the ￿rst step of ef.O n c e a g e n t s
in step 1 are handled, iteration of the same logic implies the desired conclusion. Let step 1 of









k.S ot h e r ea r e
‘k loop-orders and k serial-orders in step 1 of ef. Recall that (i) all agents in a loop-order are
existing tenants, (ii) every existing tenant a ∈ AE is assigned her current house ha under η(f)
and (iii) each agent in a loop-order receives her top choice among the houses those are assigned
to members of her loop-order. Consider agents in loop-order L1
1.B yd e ￿nition of a loop-order
each member of L1
1 is assigned the current house of a member of loop-order L1
1 under matching
ψf.S i n c eef is a serial-dictatorship and since L1
1 is a loop-order, each agent in L1
1 receives her
top choice among all houses under ψf. Moreover by construction each agent in L1
1 is assigned
her current house under matching η(f). Therefore each member of L1
1 should be assigned her
top choice under matching ϕη(f) or otherwise members of L1
1 will block ϕη(f) contradicting ϕη(f)
is the core allocation for housing market η(f). Hence ϕη(f)(a)=ψf(a) for each agent a in
loop-order L1
1. Fix the assignments of these agents under ϕη(f).
Next consider agents in loop-order L1
2.B y d e ￿nition of a loop-order each member of L1
2
is assigned the current house of a member of loop-order L1
2 under matching ψf.S i n c eef is a
17serial-dictatorship and since L1
2 is a loop-order, each agent in L1
2 receives her top choice among
all remaining houses (i.e. houses in H \ψf(L1
1)) under ψf. By construction each agent in L1
2 is
assigned her current house under η(f) and therefore under matching ϕη(f) each member of L1
2
should be assigned her top choice among all remaining houses or otherwise members of L1
2 will
block ϕη(f). Hence ϕη(f)(a)=ψf(a) for each agent a in loop-order L1
2 as well. Proceeding in
a similar way we shall have ϕη(f)(a)=ψf(a) for any agent a w h oi sam e m b e ro fal o o p - o r d e r
preceding serial-order S1
1. Fix assignments of these agents under ϕη(f) as well.
For the moment skip serial-order S1
1 and proceed with the next loop-order L1
‘1+1.B y d e -
￿nition of a loop-order each member of L1
‘1+1 is assigned the current house of a member of
loop-order L1
‘1+1 under matching ψf. By construction of the steps of eﬀective-order ef,e a c h
agent in L1
‘1+1 prefers her assignment under ψf to each house in ψf(S1
1). This together with ef
being a serial-dictatorship and L1
‘1+1 being a loop-order imply that each agent in L1
‘1+1 receives
her top choice among all houses in H\∪
‘1
r=1ψf(L1
r) (i.e. all houses whose recipients are not ￿xed
so far under ϕη(f)) under matching ψf. By construction each agent in L1
‘1+1 is assigned her
current house under η(f) and therefore under ϕη(f) each member of L1
‘1+1 should be assigned
her top choice among all houses in H \ ∪
‘1
r=1ψf(L1
r) or otherwise members of L1
‘1+1 will block
ϕη(f). Hence ϕη(f)(a)=ψf(a) for each agent a in loop-order L1
‘1+1 as well. Fix the assignments
of these agents as well under ϕη(f).N o t et h a tw ea r ea b l et ou s et h es a m ea r g u m e n ta sb e f o r e
once we observe that any member of a loop-order at step 1 prefers her assignment under ψf to
any house that is assigned to members of serial-orders at step 1 even if the serial-order precedes
the loop-order agent belongs. Proceeding in a similar way we shall have ϕη(f)(a)=ψf(a) for
any agent a who is a member of a loop-order at step 1. Fix the assignments of these agents
under ϕη(f) as well.
Next consider all agents in serial-orders S1
1,...,S1
k at step 1. By de￿nition of a serial-order,
under matching ψf each agent in AS1 is assigned either the current house of an existing tenant
in AS1 or a vacant house (that is clearly assigned at step 1). By construction of the steps of
ef,e a c ha g e n ti nAS1 prefers her assignment under ψf to each of the houses in ψf(S1).T h i s ,
together with ef being a serial-dictatorship imply that each agent in AS1 receives her top choice
among all houses in H \ψf(L1) (i.e. all houses whose recipients are not ￿xed so far under ϕη(f)
under matching ψf). By construction houses in ψf(S1) are given to members of AS1 under
matching η(f). In particular vacant houses are given to newcomers at step 1 and occupied
houses are given to their current owners each of whom is also in AS1. Therefore each agent in
AS1 should receive her top choice in H \ ψf(L1) under ϕη(f) or otherwise members of AS1 will
block. Hence ϕη(f)(a)=ψf(a) for any agent a ∈ AS1 . Fix the assignments of these agents
under ϕη(f) as well.
Once ϕη(f)(a) is ￿xed for any agent a in step 1, we can iterate the same arguments (by
handling the loop-orders ￿rst and all the serial-orders next) for agents in step 2 of ef and so
on. This completes the proof of Lemma 2. ♦
Corollary 1: Let f ∈ F∗ and let L be any loop-order of ef.L o o po r d e rL forms a cycle via
GTTCA for housing market η(f).
Proof : Directly follows from the proof of Lemma 2. ♦
184.2 Construction of Inverse Mapping g
Let ￿ ∈ M∗. Execute GTTCA. Note that it does not matter in what order cycles are removed
from the market. That is because any cycle remains a cycle as long as its members are in the
market. We ￿rst iteratively construct sets H1,...,HU of houses and sets C1,...,CU of cycles
as follows:
1. Remove any cycle that exclusively consists of existing tenants. In the process new cycles
may form. Remove any new cycle that exclusively consists of existing tenants as well.
Proceed until each remaining cycle contains at least one newcomer.
2. (a) Remove all remaining cycles (each of which contains at least one newcomer) simul-
taneously.L e tC1 be the set of these cycles. Order the agents in these cycles so that
the last agent in each cycle is a newcomer.8 Start constructing H1 by including all
houses that are assigned to members of cycles in C1. At this point new cycles that
include newcomers may form. Do not remove them yet.
(b) Remove any newly formed cycle that exclusively consists of existing tenants. Include
in H1 all houses that are assigned to members of these cycles. Proceed until each
remaining cycle contains at least one newcomer.
In general,
t. (a) Remove all remaining cycles (each of which contains at least one newcomer) simul-
taneously.L e tCt−1 be the set of these cycles. Order agents in these cycles so that
the last agent in each cycle is a newcomer. Start constructing Ht−1 by including all
houses that are assigned to members of cycles in Ct−1.A tt h i sp o i n tn e wc y c l e st h a t
include newcomers may form. Do not remove them yet.
(b) Remove any newly formed cycle that exclusively consists of existing tenants. Include
in Ht−1 all houses that are assigned to members of these cycles. Proceed until each
remaining cycle contains at least one newcomer.
The process ends when no agent remains. For each t ≤ U,l e tACt denote the set of agents
in cycles of Ct and let ϕ￿(Ct) denote the set of houses assigned to members of ACt. For any
cycle C let ϕ￿(C) denote the set of houses assigned to members of C.
Next construct sets e A2
N,..., e AU
N of newcomers as follows: For any t>1,c o n s i d e rC ∈ Ct.
By construction there is at least one newcomer in cycle C. A cycle with k newcomers can be
divided into k serial-orders where each serial-order starts with an agent who receives a vacant
house under ϕ￿ and ends with a newcomer. Let newcomer a be a member of cycle C ∈ Ct.I n
order to determine whether newcomer a belongs e At
N (i) divide cycle C into its serial orders, (ii)
￿nd the serial-order S newcomer a belongs to and (iii) check whether there exists any agent a0
in serial-order S such that hPa0ϕ￿(a0) for some h ∈ Ht−1.W eh a v ea ∈ e At
N if and only if such
an agent a0 exists.
For any t>1,e a c hc y c l eC ∈ Ct h o s t san e w c o m e rw h oi sa l s oam e m b e ro f e At
N. Otherwise
cycle C could have been removed before. For notational convenience re-organize each cycle
C ∈ Ct for any t>1 so that the last member of C belongs to e At
N.
8Note that cycle (a1,a 2,a 3,...,a k) is the same cycle with each of the following cycles: (a2,a 3,...,a k,a 1),
(a3,a 4,...,a k,a 1,a 2), ..., (ak,a 1,a 2,...,a k−1).
19We are now ready to construct inverse mapping g : M∗ → F∗. For any ￿ ∈ M∗:
1. Construct sets {Ct}, {Ht}, { e At
N}. M a k es u r et h a tf o rt>1 cycles are re-organized so
that the last agent in each cycle C ∈ Ct is a member of e At
N.
2. For any t, order the newcomers in ACt before the newcomers in ACt+1.
3. Order the newcomers in AC1 based on the index of their endowment in ￿ starting with
the agent who has the house with the smallest index.
4. For any step t>1 order the newcomers in ACt as follows:
(a) First order the newcomers in e At
N based on the index of their endowment in ￿ starting
w i t ht h ea g e n tw h oh a st h eh o u s ew i t ht h es m a l l e s ti n d e x . L e t e At
N = {￿ at
1,...,￿ at
‘}
and without loss of generality suppose house ￿(￿ at
1) has the smallest index, house
￿(￿ at
2) h a st h es e c o n ds m a l l e s ti n d e xa n ds oo ns of o r t h .T h e r e f o r ew eo r d e ra g e n t s
in e At
N as (￿ at
1,...,￿ at
‘) among themselves.
(b) In order to complete the sub-order we will insert the remaining newcomers in ACt
between agents in e At
N. The treatment for agent ￿ at
1 will be slightly diﬀerent so start
with newcomer ￿ at
2. Find the cycle newcomer ￿ at
2 belongs. Find the closest newcomer
a0 who precedes newcomer ￿ at
2 in the cycle. If a0 ∈ e At
N then she is already handled
and skip to agent ￿ at
3.I f a0 6∈ e At
N then order her right in front of ￿ at
2 and ￿nd the
closest newcomer a00 who precedes newcomer a0 in the cycle. If a00 ∈ e At
N then she is
already handled and skip to agent ￿ at
3.I f a00 6∈ e At
N then order her right in front of
newcomer a0 and proceed in a similar way until encountering a newcomer ￿ a ∈ e At
N.
Newcomer ￿ a is already handled so skip to agent ￿ at
3.
Repeat this procedure for each of the agents ￿ at
3,...,￿ at
‘.
Finally consider newcomer ￿ at
1 and ￿nd the cycle she belongs. Find the closest new-
comer a0 who precedes newcomer ￿ at
1 in the cycle. If a0 ∈ e At
N then she is already
handled and terminate the procedure. If a0 6∈ e At
N then order her at the very end
of the sub-order (that orders newcomers in ACt)a n d￿nd the closest newcomer a00
who precedes newcomer a0 in the cycle. If a00 ∈ e At
N then she is already handled and
terminate the procedure. If a0 6∈ e At
N then order her right in front of newcomer a0
and proceed in a similar way until encountering a newcomer ￿ a ∈ e At
N. Newcomer ￿ a
is already handled so terminate the procedure.
This orders newcomers in ACt among themselves in a unique way.
5. Order the existing tenants after newcomers based on their index starting with the existing
tenant with the smallest index.9
9Abdulkadiroø glu and S￿nmez (1998) study a special case of our model where there are no existing tenants.
For this case construction of mapping g simpli￿es as follows:
(a) When AE = ∅, construction of sets of houses H1,...,HU simpli￿es considerably: Here Ht is simply the
set of houses that can be removed in Round t of GTTCA.
(b) When AE = ∅, construction of sets of agents e A2
N,..., e AU
N also simpli￿es considerably: e At
N simply consists
20Next we illustrate construction of sets H1,...,HU, C1,...,CU, e A2
N,..., e AU
N as well as con-
struction of mapping g with our running example.
Example 1 continued: Let
￿ = η(f)=
￿
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15 a16
h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 h15 h16
¶
We ￿rst construct sets of houses {Ht} and sets of cycles {Ct} as we execute GTTCA. For each
market, cycles that shall be immediately removed is indicated with bold arrows and cycles that
shall remain for the remaining market is indicated with light arrows.
          
                       a1-h1           a2-h2      a3-h3      a4-h4       a5-h5 
  .  .  .  .  . 
 
            a16-h16                    a6-h6 
                 .       .  
  
                           
                a15-h15  .       .  a7-h7 
 
                                         
  .       .   
           a14-h14                 a8-h8 
 
  .  .  .  .  .   
                        a13-h13    a12-h12    a11-h11    a10-h10     a9-h9   
There are two cycles (a1,a 15) and (a6) for the initial market. Among the two, the former
hosts newcomer a15 so remove only cycle (a6) and set ϕ￿(a6)=h6.
                       a1-h1         a2-h2      a3-h3      a4-h4       a5-h5
.  .  .  . . 
  
            a16-h16       
                 .      
  
                          
                a15-h15  .                      .  a7-h7 
 
                                         
  .     .   
           a14-h14                a8-h8 
 
  .  .  .  .  .   
                        a13-h13    a12-h12    a11-h11    a10-h10     a9-h9   
 
 
In the remaining market there are three cycles (a1,a 15), (a13) and (a7).A m o n g t h e t h r e e
the ￿rst one hosts newcomer a15 and second one hosts newcomer a13 so remove only cycle (a7)
and set ϕ￿(a7)=h7.
of agents each of whom prefers some house in Ht−1 to her assignment under ϕ￿. This is because each
serial-order is a singleton for this case.
Mapping g reduces to an analogous mapping in Abdulkadiroø glu and S￿nmez (1998) under these simpli￿cations.
21                       a1-h1         a2-h2      a3-h3      a4-h4       a5-h5
.  .  .  . . 
  
            a16-h16       
                 .      
  
                           
                a15-h15  .                       
 
                                         
  .     .   
           a14-h14                a8-h8 
 
  .  .  .  .  .   
                        a13-h13    a12-h12    a11-h11    a10-h10     a9-h9   
 
 
No new cycle forms in the remaining market and each of the two present cycles hosts a
newcomer. Remove both cycles (a1,a 15) and (a13) from the market simultaneously and let C1
be the set of these cycles. Set ϕ￿(a1)=h15, ϕ￿(a15)=h1, ϕ￿(a13)=h13 and include houses
h15, h1, h13 in H1.A tt h i sp o i n tw eh a v eC1 = {(a1,a 15),(a13)} and {h15,h 1,h 13} ⊆ H1.N o t e
that while set C1 is already determined, set H1 m a yg r o wa sw ep r o c e e d .
           
                       
                                        a2-h2      a3-h3      a4-h4       a5-h5 
  .  . . . 
  
            a16-h16       
                 .      
  
                          
                         
 
                                         
  .     .   
           a14-h14                a8-h8 
 
      .  .  .  .   
               a12-h12    a11-h11    a10-h10     a9-h9   
In the remaining market there is only one cycle (a3) and it does not host a newcomer.
Remove it from the market, set ϕ￿(a3)=h3 and include house h3 in H1.A tt h i sp o i n tw eh a v e
{h15,h 1,h 13,h 3} ⊆ H1.
                            a2-h2                     a4-h4       a5-h5
  .   .  . 
  
            a16-h16        
                 .      
  
                           
                         
 
                                         
  .       .   
           a14-h14                 a8-h8 
 
      .  .  .  .   
                        a12-h12    a11-h11    a10-h10     a9-h9   
In the remaining market there is only one cycle (a2,a 4) which exclusively consists of existing
tenants. Remove it from the market, set ϕ￿(a2)=h4, ϕ￿(a4)=h2 and include houses h4, h2
in H1. At this point we have {h15,h 1,h 13,h 3,h 4,h 2} ⊆ H1.
22                         a5-h5
      .  
  
            a16-h16        
                 .      
  
                           
                                         
 
                                         
  .       .   
        a14-h14                     a8-h8 
 
   .  .  .  .   
                           a12-h12     a11-h11   a10-h10     a9-h9   
In the remaining market there are two cycles (a11,a 9,a 5,a 16), (a12,a 8,a 14) each of which
includes a newcomer. Remove them from the market simultaneously and let C2 be the set
of these cycles. Set ϕ￿(a9)=h11, ϕ￿(a5)=h9, ϕ￿(a16)=h5, ϕ￿(a11)=h16, ϕ￿(a8)=h12,
ϕ￿(a14)=h8, ϕ￿(a12)=h14, and include houses h16, h11, h9, h5, h12, h8, h14 in H2.A t t h i s
point we have C2 = {(a11,a 9,a 5,a 16),(a12,a 8,a 14)} and {h16,h 11,h 9,h 5,h 12,h 8,h 14} ⊆ H2.
   .  
                                                        a10-h10           
In the remaining market there is only one cycle (a10) which hosts newcomer a10.R e m o v ei t
f r o mt h em a r k e ta n dl e tC3 = {(a10)}.S e tϕ￿(a10)=h10 and include house h10 in H3.S i n c e
there are no remaining agents we have
C
1 = {(a1,a 15),(a13)}, C
2 = {(a11,a 9,a 5,a 16),(a12,a 8,a 14)}, C
3 = {(a10)},
H
1 = {h15,h 1,h 13,h 3,h 4,h 2},H
2 = {h16,h 11,h 9,h 5,h 12,h 8,h 14} H
3 = {h10}.
Next we ￿nd e A2
N and e A3
N. First consider cycle (a11,a 9,a 5,a 16) ∈ C2 which can be divided
into two serial-orders a11 and (a9,a 5,a 16).A g e n t a11, a member of serial-order (a11), prefers
h2 ∈ H1 to her assignment ϕ￿(a11)=h16. Therefore the tail of this serial order, namely
newcomer a11,i sam e m b e ro f e A2
N. No-one in serial-order (a9,a 5,a 16) prefers a house in H1 to
her own assignment under ϕ￿. Therefore the tail of this serial-order, namely newcomer a16,i s
not a member of e A2
N.
Next consider cycle (a12,a 8,a 14) ∈ C2 which can be divided into two serial-orders (a12)
and (a8,a 14).A g e n t a12, a member of serial-order (a12), prefers h4 ∈ H1 to her assignment
ϕ￿(a12)=h14. Therefore the tail of this serial order, namely newcomer a12,i sam e m b e ro f
e A2
N. No-one in serial-order (a8,a 14) prefers a house in H1 to her own assignment under ϕ￿.
Therefore the tail of this serial-order, namely newcomer a14,i sn o tam e m b e ro f e A2
N.
Finally consider cycle (a10) ∈ C3.A g e n ta10, a member of serial-order (a10), prefers h12 ∈ H2
to her assignment ϕ￿(a10)=h10. Therefore the tail of this serial order, namely newcomer a10,
is a member of e A3
N. Hence e A2 = {a11,a 12} and e A3 = {a10}.
We are now ready to construct ordering g(￿).
1. We ￿r s tr e o r g a n i z ec y c l e(a11,a 9,a 5,a 16) as (a9,a 5,a 16,a 11) and cycle (a12,a 8,a 14) as
(a8,a 14,a 12) so that the last agent in both cycles is a member of e A2
N.
232. Newcomers in AC1 (i.e. agents a15,a 13) are ordered before newcomers in AC2 (i.e. agents
a11,a 16,a 14,a 12) who are ordered before the newcomer in AC3 (i.e agent a10).
3. Under ￿, newcomer a13 has the smaller indexed house h13 and newcomer a15 has the
bigger indexed house h15. Therefore newcomers in AC1 are ordered as (a13,a 15).
4. Among newcomers in AC2, ￿rst consider agents a11, a12 who are members of e A2
N.U n d e r￿,
newcomer a11 has the smaller indexed house h11 and newcomer a12 has the bigger indexed
house h12. Therefore agents in e A2
N are ordered as (a11,a 12). Newcomer a12 belongs
to cycle (a8,a 14,a 12). The closest newcomer that precedes a12 is newcomer a14.S i n c e
a14 6∈ e A2
N, order her right in front of newcomer a12.S of a ra g e n t sa11, a12, a14 are ordered
as (a11,a 14,a 12). There is no other newcomer in cycle (a8,a 14,a 12) so skip to newcomer a11
who belongs to cycle (a9,a 5,a 16,a 11). The closest newcomer that precedes a11 is newcomer
a16.S i n c ea16 6∈ e A2
N, order her at the end of the sub-order that orders newcomers in AC2.
T h a tt a k e sc a r eo fn e w c o m e r si nAC2 and they are ordered as (a11,a 14,a 12,a 16).
Since a10 is the only newcomer in AC3, she is ordered last among the newcomers.
5. Finally we order existing tenants after the newcomers based on their index.
Therefore we have g(￿)=( a13,a 15,a 11,a 14,a 12,a 16,a 10,a 1,a 2,a 3,a 4,a 5,a 6,a 7,a 8,a 9).N o t e
that, since ￿ = η(f) we have g(￿)=f.
4.3 g is inverse mapping of η
We are going to show that g(η(f)) = f via three lemmata. Let f ∈ F∗, and construct ef,
{St},{Lt},{Gt},{A∗t
N} and η(f). For matching η(f), construct {Ct},{Ht},{ e At
N} and g(η(f)).
Lemma 3: For any t, each serial-order S ∈ St is part of a cycle C ∈ Ct. Conversely for any t,
any cycle C ∈ Ct can be reorganized as C =( S1,...,S k) such that Si ∈ St for all i ∈ {1,...,k}.
Proof : We are going to prove the lemma iteratively for each t.F i xt. Some of the loop-orders
in step t of ef may have already formed cycles and left the market via GTTCA before agents in
serial-orders of St−1. The remaining ones will form cycles by Corollary 1 and leave the market
after agents in serial-orders of St−1 f o r mo n eo rm o r ec y c l e sa n dl e a v et h em a r k e t .B yR e m a r k
2 serial-orders in St will not leave the market via GTTCA before serial-orders in St−1.O n c e
all loop-orders in step t of ef leave the market, serial-orders in St w i l lf o r mo n eo rm o r ec y c l e s
among themselves and leave the market via GTTCA. That is because (i) by construction of step








and (ii) by construction of η(f),f o ra n ya ∈ ASt we have η(f)(a)=ψf(a0) for some a0 ∈ ASt.
Moreover, by Remark 2 no agent in ∪
r>tASr leaves the market before each agent in ASt does.
These together with construction of Ct complete the proof of Lemma 3. ♦
Corollary 2: Execute GTTCA for housing market η(f). Any cycle that exclusively consists
of existing tenants is a loop-order in ef.
Proof : Each loop-order in ef forms a cycle via GTTCA by Corollary 1. Each remaining agent
is a member of a serial-order of ef and by Lemma 3 she leaves the market together with all
24members of her serial-order (which includes a newcomer) as a part of a cycle via GTTCA. This
implies the desired conclusion. ♦
Lemma 4 : Ht = Gt for all t.
Proof :F o re a c ht we have ψf(St) ⊆ Gt by construction of Gt. Similarly for each t we have
ϕη(f)(Ct) ⊆ Ht by construction of Ht. Moreover by Lemma 2 we have ϕη(f) = ψf and by
Lemma 3 we have ACt = ASt for all t. Therefore ϕη(f)(Ct)=ψf(St) for all t.
Claim 1: Gt ⊆ Ht for all t.
Proof of Claim 1:F i xt. We will show that Gt\ψf(St) ⊆ Ht. By construction of Gt, set
Gt\ψf(St) consists of houses allocated in loop-orders of ef each of which belongs to a step
s>t . Consider each of these loop-orders following their order in ef.L e tL be the ￿rst loop-
order such that ψf(L) ⊆ Gt\ψf(St). By Corollary 1, L will form a cycle via GTTCA and
leave the market. By Remark 1(i), there exists a house h ∈ Gt a n da na g e n ta in L such that
hPaψf(a). Since L is the ￿rst loop-order with ψf(L) ⊆ Gt\ψf(St), by construction of Gt we
have h ∈ ψf(St). Therefore since we have ACt = ASt as well as ϕη(f) = ψf and since all cycles
in Ct leave the market simultaneously via GTTCA, loop-order L forms a cycle via GTTCA and
leaves the market after each of the cycles in Ct. Moreover by Remark 1(ii), any agent a00 in L
prefers ψf(a00) to any house in Gs for any s>t .T h i st o g e t h e rw i t hACs = ASs for all s and
ϕη(f) = ψf imply that L f o r m sac y c l ev i aG T T C Aa n dl e a v e st h em a r k e tbefore any cycle in Cs
for any s>t . Therefore by construction of Ht we have ψf(L) ⊆ Ht. Next let L0 be the second
loop-order in ef such that ψf(L0) ⊆ Gt\ψf(St). By Remark 1(i), there exists a house h0 ∈ Gt
a n da na g e n ta0 in L0 such that h0Pa0ψf(a0). By construction of Gt we have h ∈ ψf(St)∪ψf(L).
Therefore since we have ACt = ASt as well as ϕη(f) = ψf and since L leaves the market after
all cycles in Ct all of which leave the market simultaneously, loop-order L0 forms a cycle via
GTTCA and leaves the market after each of the cycles in Ct. Moreover by Remark 1(ii), any
agent a00 in L0 prefers ψf(a00) to any house in Gs for any s>t .This together with ACs = ASs
for all s and ϕη(f) = ψf imply that L0 forms a cycle via GTTCA and leaves the market before
any cycle in Cs for any s>t . Therefore by construction of Ht we have ψf(L0) ⊆ Ht. Following
in a similar way we obtain Gt\ψf(St) ⊆ Ht. Moreover since ψf(St)=ϕη(f)(Ct) ⊆ Ht we have
Gt ⊆ Ht completing the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 2: Ht ⊆ Gt for all t.
Proof of Claim 2 :F i xt. We will show that Ht\ϕη(f)(Ct) ⊆ Gt. By construction of Ht,
the set Ht\ϕη(f)(Ct) consists of the houses allocated to existing tenants who form cycles via
GTTCA and leave the market after the cycles in Ct and before the cycles in Ct+1.C o n s i d e r
each of these cycles one at a time following the order they leave the market via GTTCA (and
arbitrarily order the cycles which form simultaneously). Let C be the ￿rst such cycle. By
Corollary 2, C is a loop-order in ef.S i n c e C forms and leaves the market only after the
cycles in Ct, there exists an agent a in C and a house h ∈ ϕη(f)(Ct)=ψf(St) ⊆ Gt such that
hPaϕη(f)(a). Moreover since C f o r m sa n dl e a v e st h em a r k e tb e f o r et h ec y c l e si nCt+1,w eh a v e
ϕη(f)(a00)Pa00h00 for any agent a00 in C and for any house h00 ∈ Hs for any s>t .Therefore since
Gs ⊆ Hs for all s by Claim 1, we have ϕη(f)(a00)Pa00h00 for any agent a00 in C and any house
h00 ∈ Gs for any s>t .H e n c eb yR e m a r k1w eh a v eϕη(f)(C) ⊆ Gt. Next consider the second
such cycle C0. By Corollary 2, C0 is a loop-order in ef.S i n c eC0 f o r m sa n dl e a v e st h em a r k e t
only after the cycles in Ct and not before cycle C, there exists an agent a0 in C0 and a house
h0 ∈ ϕη(f)(Ct)∪ϕη(f)(C)=ψf(St)∪ϕη(f)(C) ⊆ Gt such that h0Pa0ϕη(f)(a0). Since C0 forms and
leaves the market before the cycles in Ct+1,w eh a v eϕη(f)(a00)Pa00h00 for any agent a00 in C0 and for
25any house h00 ∈ Hs ⊇ Gs for any s>t .Hence by Remark 1 we have ϕη(f)(C0) ⊆ Gt. Following
in a similar way, we obtain Ht\ϕη(f)(Ct) ⊆ Gt. Moreover since ϕη(f)(Ct)=ψf(St) ⊆ Gt we have
Ht ⊆ Gt completing the proofs of Claim 2 and Lemma 4. ♦
De￿ne H1
V = H1 ∩ HV. For each t>1 de￿ne e Ht
V = {h ∈ Ht ∩ HV : h = η(f)(a) for some
newcomer a ∈ e At
N}
Corollary 3: e At
N = A∗t
N and e Ht
V=G∗t
V for any t>1 .





V for any t. ♦
Lemma 5: g(η(f)) = f.
Proof : We will show that each agent￿s order is the same under f and g(η(f)). We proceed by
induction.
1. Let a ∈ A1
N = AS1 ∩ AN = AC1 ∩ AN be a newcomer with f(i)=a for some order i.B y




V by Lemma 4. Therefore η(f)(a) is also the i￿th smallest indexed house in H1
V.
Since mapping g orders newcomers in AC1 before other newcomers and since this order
is based on the index of their endowments under η(f),a g e n ta should be ordered i￿th by
ordering g(η(f)) as well.
2. Assume that for each step r ∈ {2,...,t − 1} of ef and for any agent a ∈ Ar
N,a g e n ta￿s
order is the same under f and g(η(f)).
We will show that for each a ∈ At
N = ASt ∩ AN = ACt ∩ AN,a g e n ta￿s order should be
same under f and g(η(f)).
Recall that A∗t
N = e At
N b yC o r o l l a r y3 .F i r s tw es h o wt h a ta g e n t si nA∗t
N are ordered the
same among themselves under f and g(η(f)). Fix a∗ ∈ A∗t
N and let ordering f order her i￿th
among agents in A∗t
N. By construction of η(f), house η(f)(a∗) is the i￿th smallest indexed
house in G∗t
V . Moreover by Corollary 3 we have e Ht
V = G∗t
V . Therefore house η(f)(a∗) is the
i￿th smallest indexed house in e Ht
V. Since mapping g orders newcomers in e At
N based on
the index of their endowments under η(f),a g e n ta∗ should be ordered i￿th among agents
in e At
N = A∗t
N by ordering g(η(f)) as well. Next we show that the remaining newcomers in
At
N a r eo r d e r e dt h es a m eu n d e rf and g(η(f)). We have two cases to consider:
Case 1: i>1.L e t n e w c o m e r a∗∗ ∈ A∗t
N be such that a∗∗ is ordered (i − 1)￿th among
newcomers in A∗t
N under f as well as g(η(f)). Consider the newcomers who are ordered
between newcomers a∗∗ and a∗ under f. First consider newcomer a ∈ At
N\A∗t
N who is
ordered right before a∗ under f. Let S∗ be the serial-order newcomer a∗ belongs in ef.
By construction of η(f) house η(f)(a) is the vacant house allocated in S∗ under ψf and
by Lemma 3 serial-order S∗ is a part of a cycle C ∈ Ct. These together with ϕη(f) = ψf
imply that newcomer a also belongs to cycle C and she is ordered right before S∗ in




N, she is also ordered right before newcomer a∗
under g(η(f)) by construction of mapping g. Next consider newcomer a0 ∈ At
N\A∗t
N who
is ordered right before newcomer a under f.L e tS be the serial-order newcomer a belongs
in ef.B y c o n s t r u c t i o n o f η(f) house η(f)(a0) is the vacant house allocated in S under
26ψf. Since newcomer a belongs to cycle C, serial-order S is part of cycle C by Lemma 3.
These together with ϕη(f) = ψf imply that newcomer a0 also belongs to cycle C and she




N, she is ordered right
before newcomer a under g(η(f)). Following in a similar way, we show that newcomers
between a∗∗ and a∗ under f are ordered the same among themselves under f and g(η(f)).
Case 2: i =1 . By construction of A∗t
N, newcomer a∗ is ordered ￿rst among agents in At
N
under f.L e tS∗ be the serial order newcomer a∗ belongs in ef. Let newcomer a∗∗ ∈ A∗t
N
be the agent who is ordered last among newcomers in A∗t
N under f and g(η(f)). Consider
newcomers in At
N who are ordered after newcomer a∗∗ under f. Let newcomer a ∈ At
N\A∗t
N
be the last agent under f among newcomers in At
N. By construction of η(f) house η(f)(a)
is the vacant house allocated in S∗ under ψf and by Lemma 3 serial-order S∗ is a part of
ac y c l eC ∈ Ct. These together with ϕη(f) = ψf imply that newcomer a also belongs to





is also ordered last among newcomers in At
N under g(η(f)) by construction of mapping
g. Next consider newcomer a0 ∈ At
N\A∗t
N who is ordered right before newcomer a under
f.L e t S be the serial-order newcomer a belongs in ef. By construction of η(f) house
η(f)(a0) is the vacant house allocated in S under ψf. Since newcomer a belongs to cycle
C, serial-order S is part of cycle C by Lemma 3. These together with ϕη(f) = ψf imply
that newcomer a0 also belongs to cycle C and she is ordered right before S in cycle C.




N, she is ordered right before newcomer a under g(η(f)) as
well. Following in a similar way we show that newcomers after a∗∗ in step t of ef are
ordered the same among themselves under f and g(η(f)).
This covers all newcomers in At
N and shows that they are ordered the same under f and
g(η(f)).
This shows that newcomers are ordered the same under f and g(η(f)). Finally existing
tenants are ordered after the newcomers based on their index under both f and g(η(f)).T h i s
concludes the proof of Lemma 5. ♦
4.4 Proof of the Main Result
We are now ready to prove our main result.
Theorem 1: Lottery mechanisms Φ and Ψ are equivalent.














Both mechanisms select a uniform lottery over m! matchings for each problem. Fix a problem.
For each ordering f ∈ F∗ construct matching η(f) ∈ M∗. B yL e m m a2w eh a v eψf = ϕη(f)
and by Lemma 5 mapping η is invertible. Hence Φ = Ψ. ♦
274.5 Implications for the House Allocation Problems
A house allocation problem (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1977) is a special case of our model
where there are only newcomers and vacant houses.10 A popular real-life mechanism in this
context is random serial-dictatorship: Randomly order the agents and assign the ￿rst agent
her top choice, the second agent her top choice among the remaining houses and so on. Another
natural mechanism is core from random endowments: Randomly allocate the houses to
agents, interpret it as an initial endowment, and choose the core (or equivalently competitive
allocation) of the induced housing market. Abdulkadiroø glu and S￿nmez (1998) show that the
two mechanisms are equivalent and we obtain their result as an immediate corollary to Theorem
1.
Corollary 4: The random serial dictatorship is equivalent to core from random endowments
for house allocation problems.
Proof : YRMH-IGYT algorithm reduces to a serial-dictatorship when there are no existing
tenants. This together with Theorem 1 imply the desired result. ♦
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we show that there is an important relation between two intuitive house alloca-
tion mechanisms which are designed to avoid ineﬃciencies in those situations where there are
existing tenants and newcomers. Since the core (or equivalently the competitive mechanism)
is the undisputed mechanism in the context of housing markets, it is tempting to extend this
mechanism via constructing an initial allocation by assigning existing tenants their current
houses and randomly assigning vacant houses to newcomers. However this extended mecha-
nism grants initial property rights of vacant houses to newcomers and therefore its equivalence
to ￿newcomer favoring￿ top trading cycles algorithm is quite intuitive. We believe our result
provides additional support for the top trading cycles mechanism by showing that its main
competitor is a very biased special case.
References
[1] Abdulkadiroø glu, A., S￿nmez, T., 1998. Random serial dictatorship and the core from random
endowments in house allocation problems. Econometrica 66, 689-701.
[2] Abdulkadiroø glu, A., S￿nmez, T., 1999. House allocation with existing tenants. J. Econ.
Theory 88, 233-260.
[3] Abdulkadiroø glu, A., S￿nmez, T., 2003. Ordinal eﬃciency and dominated sets of assignments.
J. Econ. Theory 112, 157-172.
[4] Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin H., 2001. A new solution to the random assignment problem. J.
Econ. Theory 100, 295-328.
10See also Abdulkadiroø glu and S￿nmez (1998, 2003), Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001), Chambers (2003),
Ehlers (2002), Ehlers and Klaus (2003a, b), Ehlers, Klaus and Papai (2002), Ergin (2000, 2002), Kesten (2003a,
b), Miyagawa (2001, 2002), Papai (2000), Schummer (2000), Svensson (1994, 1999) and Zhou (1990).
28[5] Chambers, C. P., 2003. Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model. J. Math. Econ.,
forthcoming.
[6] Chen, Y., S￿nmez T. , 2002. Improving eﬃciency of on-campus housing: an experimental
study. American Economic Review 92, 1669-1689.
[7] Chen, Y., S￿nmez, T, 2004. An experimental study of house allocation mechanisms. Econ.
Letters 83, 137-140.
[8] Ehlers, L., 2002. Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation. J. Econ. Theory 105, 298-317.
[9] Ehlers, L., Klaus B., 2003a. Coalitional strategy-proof and resource monotonic solutions for
multiple assignment problems. Soc. Choice Welfare 21, 265-280.
[10] Ehlers, L., Klaus, B., 2003b. Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems. Int. J.
Game Theory,f o r t h c o m i n g .
[11] Ehlers, L., Klaus, B., Papai, S., 2002. Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity in
house allocation problems. J. Math. Econ. 38, 329-339.
[12] Ergin, H., 2000. Consistency in house allocation problems. J. Math. Econ. 34, 77-97.
[13] Ergin, 2002. Eﬃcient resource allocation on the basis of priorities. Econometrica 70, 2489-
2497.
[14] Hylland, A., Zeckhauser, R., 1977. The eﬃcient allocation of individuals to positions. J.
Polit. Economy 87, 293-314.
[15] Kesten, O., 2003a. On two competing mechanisms. University of Rochester mimeo.
[16] Kesten, O., 2003b. Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house
allocation problems. University of Rochester mimeo.
[17] Ma, J., 1994. Strategy-proofness and strict core in a market with indivisibilities. Int. J.
Game Theory 23, 75-83.
[18] Miyagawa, E., 2001. House allocation with transfers. J. Econ. Theory 100, 329-355.
[19] Miyagawa, E., 2002. Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems. Games
Econ. Behav. 38, 347-361.
[20] Moulin, H., 1995. Cooperative Microeconomics. A Game Theoretic Introduction. Princeton
University Press, Princeton.
[21] Papai, S. 2000. Strategyproof assignment by hierarchical exchange. Econometrica 68, 1403-
1433.
[22] Roth, A. E., 1982. Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisibilities. Econ. Letters
9, 127-132.
[23] Roth, A. E., Postlewaite, A., 1977. Weak versus strong domination in a market with
indivisible goods. J. Math. Econ. 4, 131-137.
29[24] Schummer, J., 2000. Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation. Games
Econ. Behav. 30, 293-318.
[25] Shapley, L. S., Scarf, H., 1974. On cores and indivisibility. J. Math. Econ. 1, 23-28.
[26] Svensson, L.-G., 1994. Queue allocation of indivisible goods. Soc. Choice Welfare 11, 323-
330.
[27] Svensson, L.-G., 1999. Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods. Soc. Choice Welfare
16, 557-567.
[28] Zhou, L., 1990. On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems. J. Econ.
Theory 52, 123-135.
30